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Introduction
In law, as in other disciplines, there is an increased call for the advancement of interdisciplinary research. This call is informed by a general perception that academic disciplines tend to exist in "silos" and that this is in some way a bad thing.
Therefore research across disciplinary boundaries will result in a more integrated scientific enterprise and this is regarded as a good thing. In particular, there are calls for researchers in academia to do research on education practices and pedagogy. 1 Law as a discipline has not escaped this general trend. 2 The rise (and mostly fall) of interdisciplinary attempts like law-and-economics, law-and-literature and law-and-sociology bear witness to this. 3 In fact, at UNISA the advancement of multi-, inter-and transdisciplinary (MIT) research is regarded as a strategic objective in the College of Law. 4 It is this direct factor, as well as the more general one already mentioned, that has provided the rationale for this article. See Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 950: "Interdisciplinary scholarship is now an expected part of a serious scholar's work at most of the elite law schools in this country (the USA). Because these schools generally are looked up to as leaders of academic fashion and because they produce most of the new law professors, one would think that the future of interdisciplinary scholarship looks exceedingly bright. Indeed, I want to emphasize that at most elite schools today a bright young scholar who professed no interest whatsoever in interdisciplinary scholarship would find it very hard to get a job." 3 Some of these past attempts will be discussed in sections 5 and 6 below. There are various references to UNISA in this article. These should be regarded as illustrations, but the assumption is that these kinds of programmes and objectives exist at most, if not all, universities.
to define what multi-, inter-and transdisciplinarity mean and decide whether it is possible to do this in law.
It must be reiterated that this is not about research methods. Methodology asks much more fundamental and difficult questions. To attempt to answer these questions, this paper is divided into five sections. The first part tries to determine what science is and whether law can be properly regarded as science. The second part looks at the division between the sciences to determine where law fits in. The focus then shifts to the nature of a discipline to determine what kind of discipline law is. The fourth section defines multi-, inter-and transdisciplinarity before moving to a conclusion about interdisciplinarity in law.
The Royal Society and the nature of science
The following story is included as part of the history of science and is intended to illustrate some of the abstract concepts throughout. Kant's ideas on science are informed by both a rejection of metaphysics and an attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. The second aspect will be dealt with later, but the first depends on his distinction between phenomena and noumena.
Phenomena are things that can be observed and therefore known in a scientific way.
These are the things we can know "the truth" about in some more-or-less absolute way. The noumena, on the other hand, are the things-in-themselves or the essences of things. These are things we cannot "know" in the scientific sense of the word since we cannot observe them.
14 Noumena might be true and people might believe them to be true, but their truth cannot be established in a scientific manner. Lyotard Postmodern Condition 31-37. 16 This is, for example, the case with most religious "stories," which do not require proof. The mere fact that the story is told is enough for believers.
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This is the famous example of the theory that "all swans are white". It is impossible to observe all the swans in the world, therefore the theory cannot be proved true. However, the observation of one black swan would falsify the theory instantly. claiming it is merely traditional to distinctions based on the subject matter. These reasons are not convincing. The idea of dividing a university into faculties or schools is fairly recent and traditionally everything was regarded as "Arts", 23 so tradition cannot explain the division. The idea that the division is based on subject matter presupposes that natural sciences study nature, social sciences study society and humanities study humans. But that would make at least the distinction between social and human sciences problematic, as humans cannot be divorced from the society they live in. The differences are more fundamental and have to do with the methodologies of the various sciences. And those differences boil down to the difference between empiricism and rationalism.
24
Scientists have long been divided over the question of whether knowledge depends on empirical observation or on rational constructs. So it is worthwhile to spend some time examining these two methodologies. Empiricism rests on the assumption that objects of study must be observed empirically (that is by the senses) and from these observations we deduce general rules which provide the basis for predictions about future events. 25 Astronomers had observed the orbit of Venus for hundreds of years and could therefore comfortably predict that a transit would occur on 3 rd June 1769
and would be observable from Haiti. Collini What Are Universities For? 23-26. 24 I do not use "rationalism" here in its general meaning of "based on reason", but as a very specific methodology.
25
This is known as "the" scientific method. See Gorham Philosophy of Science 54ff for a discussion of the difference between rationalism and empiricism.
26
A transit occurs when Venus moves between the sun and the earth and can be seen from earth as a small black dot against the sun. It is one of the rarest predictable astronomical phenomena. The most recent transit occurred on 4 th June 2012 and could be observed from South Africa. See NASA 2012 http://www.1.usa.gov/K0q2wc. senses can be deceived, 27 or because the specific phenomenon is not observable.
28
In the case of empiricism the "proof" therefore consists of observable phenomena and predictable occurrences, but in the case of rationalism the "proof" depends on the logical consistency and rational justification of a position. Theology is traditionally regarded as a science, even though it does not meet the criteria set out in section 2 above regarding falsification.
34
On the basis of the falsification criteria set out in section 2 above, it is doubtful whether psychology would qualify
It is interesting to note that this division implies that mathematics (which is normally regarded as a natural science) should actually be regarded as part of the humanities.
After all, numbers, equations and formulae are entirely man-made and essentially unobservable phenomena and therefore quintessentially rationalist. 35 It also implies that Computer Science (as the study of algorithms) is a humanities discipline, even though it is usually grouped in the Science Faculty in the university context. And perhaps this is why many of the most prominent philosophers of science were mathematicians and recently computer scientists. 36 But that is not the main conclusion to be drawn from this. The important thing is that the research methodology determines how we differentiate between the sciences.
The question now is where law fits into this scheme. Perhaps the most important single thing to say in this context about the work in the humanities is that it is in many ways not so different from work in the natural and social sciences. The effort to understand and explain that is at the heart of all scholarly and scientific enquiry is governed by broadly similar canons of accuracy and precision, of rigour in argument and clarity in presentation, of respect for the evidence and openness to criticism, and so on.
Nussbaum's view of what humanities teach is not one that is limited to the humanities. Instead it should be the purpose of all higher education. What the two viewpoints illustrate is exactly that all sciences and scientific teaching have the same purpose -it is the methodology that differs.
What is a discipline?
Having established that law is part of the human sciences and is inclined toward the rationalist methodology, the question that now It will be noted that most of the references to law, legal methodology and legal research come from either continental or American writers. The fact of the matter is that South African authors rarely, if ever, engage with the question of the disciplinary nature of law and legal research. But, given the universal nature of science, the insights from these writers are applicable to the South African context. 1-70. 57 This is the main contention behind the Realists' insistence on looking at "what courts actually do" -see Hoctor "Legal Realism" 158-185.
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The third group represents a rejection of the positivism inherent in the first group in particular by seeing law as a normative discipline. 58 In this case the emphasis of legal research is on constructing a normative framework for law in order that normative choices can be made.
59
In the South African context, most legal researchers will find one or more of these approaches convincing, based on where they studied -in effect, whose disciples they are/were. Traditionally Afrikaans universities use a descriptive, axiomatic and logical approach to the study of law, whilst the approach in English universities is focused on argumentation and normative approaches. Those who studied at the first set of universities will therefore be more inclined to view law as a very ordered and logical set of propositions and concepts, while those who studied at the second group will be more inclined toward seeing law as a set of normative disagreements.
This, therefore, offers a striking illustration of the nature of research discipline and paradigms.
It should be fairly clear that law is not an empirical discipline in the sense that chemistry is, for example. 60 Describing law as an axiomatic, explanatory or logical discipline is too limited. Whilst description, systematisation and conceptualisation are certainly part of the picture, it is not enough to describe something as a scientific discipline. If we accept that falsification is the basic requirement for something to be regarded as scientific, then the first group of approaches fails at the first hurdle as they do not attempt to falsify, but merely to describe. noumena. 61 They are therefore inherently not falsifiable and therefore not scientific.
As Schlag 62 says:
Values are like little divinities. Like God, they serve as grounds or unquestioned origins. Like God, their invocation demands worship, reverence and selfabnegation. Like God, they provide comfort and compensation for an otherwise degraded reality. Like God, they enable the widespread belief in a hopeful, eschatological trajectory for law, politics, and human existence. In short, 'values' are the secular equivalent of God -they are the continuation of theology by other means.
The second group offers the most promising approach. The paradigmatic methodology in legal research is the finding, interpretation, application and critique of law and legal rules. That implies that normal legal research (in the Kuhnian sense)
will always consider the history, philosophy, comparative perspective and sociopolitical circumstances of any specific problem. Most importantly, the essence of this methodology is the implicit acceptance of the principle of falsification. Any theory about any legal problem starts with the assumption: the court/legislator/old authority/state got it wrong! It therefore meets the falsification requirement. But that is not the full picture.
What is missing is the fact that law is also very much a professional discipline. In fact Balkin 63 argues that law is not an academic discipline at all, exactly because of its professional nature. Most law professors were trained in professional law schools and continue to teach their students how to "think like lawyers". As Balkin 64 states:
" (Law) is a skills-oriented profession, and legal education is a form of professional education. Because law is a professional discipline, it lacks a robust academic methodology...." The discussion above indicates that this is overstating the case.
Ironically, "thinking like a lawyer" strengthens the falsification thesis. After all, the job of a criminal lawyer, for example, is not to prove his client's innocence, but to falsify the state's case. Given the methodological differences between the sciences and the disciplinary distinctiveness, one wonders what MIT could possibly mean or entail. And determining the meaning here is far from simple. In fact, there seem to be as many opinions as there are authors. 65 The explanation offered below is informed in the first place by the principle of statutory interpretation that, if different words are used, they must mean different things. In the second place it is informed by insights from other disciplines -something that definitely does NOT make it MIT. Given these points of departure, the following distinctions can be drawn.
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Multidisciplinary research means that scientists from a multiplicity of disciplines look at the same phenomenon/problem. 67 It is always a group effort. In the case of Banks's voyage, you have zoologists, botanists, astronomers, etcetera looking at
Haiti from different disciplinary stances. 68 In a sense this is the easiest kind of MIT research: every scientist works within and from his/her own discipline and the different perspectives come together in the end. 69 It might or might not result in co- 260-261. 68 An excellent example of this is the animal rights conference hosted by the Department of Jurisprudence at UNISA last year. All of the papers of that conference were published in the first edition of SA Public law for 2012.
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As Fish says: "One is always within whatever discipline one is in, and one simply assimilates and feeds information from and about other disciplines into one's pre-existing disciplinary matrix" -see Fish There's No Such Thing as Free Speech 231-242. Interdisciplinary research is unusual and very, very hard to do. This happens when a single researcher is a disciplinary expert in more than one discipline and he/she uses the methodology of both to address a problem. 70 It is interesting to note that many of the most brilliant and innovative scientists were trained in more than one discipline. 71 For example the astronomer William Herschel started life as a professional musician and composer, and taught himself mathematics and the craft of polishing large mirrors. This enabled him to build very powerful telescopes which he used to discover Uranus, amongst other discoveries. In fact, historians speculate that it was his skill in reading music that enabled him to search the stars more systematically than his contemporaries.
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In the legal world interdisciplinary research would, for example, be undertaken by someone qualified in both medicine and law; or versed in both law and literary theory and criticism. Unfortunately law researchers think that if they can read novels, they can do law and literature, but that is not the case. 73 True interdisciplinary research requires a thorough grounding in more than one discipline.
Having a postgraduate qualification in both law and economics; both medicine and law; both computer science and law; or both sociology and law qualifies one to do interdisciplinary work. The rest do not. And the fact of the matter is that law's professional nature militates very strongly against this.
Transdisciplinary research is even rarer. This is where interdisciplinary research results in the establishment of a new discipline. 74 This is the case where, for example, Banks established anthropology by using the disciplines of zoology and botany and applying it to human beings and culture. But this implies that the methodologies of two distinct disciplines get merged into a completely new and 70 This is also the definition that is used in UNISA's various research policies.
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Of course, in the contemporary world this is becoming increasingly unlikely. When science became a professional enterprise rather than something "gentlemen of leisure" engaged in, specialisation became inevitable. research that is somehow hip, new, different and that it will be somehow "more" than ordinary disciplinary research. The background assumptions are that the differences between the terms multi-, inter-and transdisciplinary research are of degree rather than kind and that they will always imply group research and/or copublication. But using them like this is both facile and misleading.
Multidisciplinary research might result in co-publication, but it probably won't. Given that multidisciplinarity requires disciplinary specialists to continue to work within their disciplines, it really is neither new nor particularly different. Interdisciplinarity by definition is an individual enterprise, but it is the only case where innovative work and results can be expected. Transdisciplinarity presupposes the establishment of a new discipline, one that will then take on all the characteristics of ordinary disciplinary research. The study of law is part of a professional practice, a set of professional skills that are taught to new professionals in professional schools. Law is, moreover, a deceptively strong professional practice, and its modes of reproduction are amazingly resilient. Thus, even though law professors continually absorb ever new and exotic forms of theory from without, they continue to teach their students the same basic skills using the same basic methods.
Whether or not interdisciplinarity is possible in law therefore depends on your understanding of law as a hermeneutic and professional discipline. To explain this, it is necessary to return to the terms multi-, inter-and transdisciplinarity.
Multidisciplinarity is not only possible in law, it is something legal researchers regularly do, have done and will continue to do. Because law is a social artefact, the consideration of legal issues and problems will always and necessarily require looking at socio-political and economic factors, for example. This is a conscious or unconscious mirroring of what courts do. A judicial decision that looks at legal rules and legal rules only is basically impossible. That is one of the reasons why regarding law as an axiomatic or logical discipline only is impossible.
There is virtually no legal researcher in South Africa today that does not accept that law and legal research makes sense only within a socio-economic-political context.
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Therefore normal science in law will also include insights from various disciplines. Expecting law academics to do this kind of research is futile and counter-productive.
The conclusion is that interdisciplinarity is a dream in legal research. Because of the nature of the disciplinary training that lawyers undergo, they are not equipped to do the kind of research that is undertaken in the natural and social sciences. As Balkin 80 says:
The point is not that legal education fails to teach lawyers how to engage in empirical research. The point is that it teaches lawyers how not to think empirically. Law school teaches lawyers to be quick on their feet and to look for the sort of things that can be cited in the footnotes of briefs.
So, there is both bad news and good news. The bad news is that the vast majority of MIT research is something legal researchers already do (multidisciplinary research) or never will (interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research). That is also the good news. Disciplinary research is hard enough. There is no need to complicate it unnecessarily. 
